Sāçaklīzāde's Risālah Waladiyyah: A Treatise on the Art of Disputation for Beginners

Md. Asham Ahmad*
mdasham@ikim.gov.my

Abstract

Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓarah arose as a science in the Islamic world at the end of the 7th/13th century. It is a creative synthesis of logic and juridical dialectics, and was known during the classical period as jadal (dialectic), and in jurisprudence as ʿilm al-khīlāf. The aim of a munāẓarah is to arrive at the truth by the means of a regulated disputation, in which a proposition and its proof can be cross-examined by the disputants. This article introduces Risālah Waladiyyah by Sāçaklīzāde (d. 1737/42), a manual of Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓarah for beginners.

Keywords

Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓarah, Sāçaklīzāde, Risālah Waladiyyah, knowledge, disputation, jadal, dialectic.

---

* Senior Fellow, Centre for the Study of Shariʿah, Law and Politics, Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia (IKIM), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓarah (The Conduct of Inquiry and Disputation) is a creative synthesis of logic and juridical dialectics, believed to have been introduced by a Ḥanafī scholar, Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandi (1303). His treatise on the subject entitled Risālah fī Ādāb al-Baḥth, became very famous and influential among all other madrasah tracts of that period, rivalled only by the treatise of ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ijī (756/1355). These two works were then commented on by a number of scholars. Later on, individual treatises on Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓarah began to appear, and among them were treatises written by al-Jurjānī (816/1413), Tāşköprīzāde (968/1561), Sāçaḳlīzāde (1150/1737), and Gelenbevi (1205/1791).

The new science, which began in the Central Asian Hanafism, gradually gained popularity among Ottoman scholarly circles. It became an indispensable tool for Muslim scholarship because of its role in regulating debates in philosophy, theology, and law. From mainly the traditions of juristic and philosophical dialectics, ādāb al-baḥth arose as a general theory of argumentation applicable in all disciplines as testified by the existence of numerous treaties and glosses. In the 18th century, students in the Ottoman madrasahs are said to have required to learn the subject using a number of texts with the aid of commentaries and glosses.

This new discipline is central to the post classical Islamic scholarship, and yet, despite its significance in Islamic intellectual history, it suffers from scholarly neglect. Abdelsamad Belhaj,


3. According to Sāçaḳlīzāde, the result had not been very satisfactory because the students did not have a suitable text, and it is for that reason he wrote Taqrīr al-Qawānīn, in which the rules of disputation are collected, and then Risālah Waladīyyah, the summary of the text see his Tartīb alʿUlūm, 141.
however, believes that one of the significant contributions of recent scholarship in Islamic studies is the rejection of the myth that post-classical Islam was the age of stagnation. Recent studies in the history of logic and *usūl al-fiqh* have shown that the disciplines continued to thrive and flourish in the Mamluk, Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal eras, and it is generally acknowledged that *Ilm al-Munāẓarah* owes its origin to logic and juridical dialectic (*jadal fighi*).  

In a study entitled *Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century: Scholarly Currents in the Ottoman Empire and The Maghreb*, Khaled El-Rouayheb argues that the popularity of *Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓarah* in the 17th century is a proof that the rational spirit was well alive and vibrant in the Muslim world, and therefore the popular view held by the historians that the 12th century onwards is the age of general decline and stagnation in scientific activity in the Islamic world is not actually supported by historical evidence. In his work, El-Rouayheb studied three scholarly currents of the time namely (i) the influx of Azeri and Kurdish scholars into the Ottoman Empire; (ii) the eastward movement of Moroccan scholars bringing with it Sanūsī’s anti-*taqlīd* rational theology; and (iii) the influence of Indian and Azeri scholars belonging to the school of *waḥdat al-wujūd* in the Near East. The effect of the influx of the Azeri and Kurdish scholars can be seen in the introduction of *The Books of the Persians* in the Ottoman scholarly circle, and the new method of teaching based on dialectic (*ādāb al-baḥth*) and careful reading of the text (*ādāb al-muṭālaʿah*).  

A doctoral dissertation by Larry Miller in 1984 entitled *Islamic Disputation Theory* is generally regarded as the most comprehensive and detailed contribution to the study of
Islamic dialectic. Miller claims that early literature in juridical disagreement (khilāf or ikhtilāf) is not dialectical in nature; it was theological dialectic that developed first and only later on taken over by the jurists. This claim has been challenged by Walter Edward Young in his recent work entitled *The Dialectical Forge: Juridical Disputation and the Evolution of Islamic Law*, who insists instead that “a formulaic, systematic and sophisticated juridical dialectic is clearly evident in the early ikhtilāf literature.” In this detailed study of early literature on juridical disputation, Young argues that:

“juridical disputation was a vital dynamic in the evolution of Islamic law—not only with respect to doctrinal bodies of substantive rulings, but also to Islamic legal theories, and to a continually evolving set of dialectical theories as well.”

The Development of Argumentative Tradition in Islām

As known from the Qur’ān, the argumentative tradition in Islam begins with the Holy Prophet ﷺ himself who had been asked to debate with the Jews, Christians and polytheists. There was no reason to exercise independent reasoning either in religious or political matters because the Prophet ﷺ was the living authority from whom Muslims would get answers for their questions, and solutions for their disputes. Furthermore, Muslims were also strongly reminded not to engage in futile disputations. The situation changed drastically with the death of the Prophet. In

8. Ibid, 1.
the second/eighth century, dialectical questions were being asked regarding human agency, and as a result, two opposing opinions emerged: one was championed by the Qādirites and the other by the Jabrites. The Qādirite position which emphasised human free will and responsibility, however, encouraged theoretical and active opposition to the Umayyad regime. Therefore, the Umayyad Caliphs, especially after ʿAbd al-Malik bin Marwan (d. 86/705), openly took the deterministic view and demanded that the acts of the rulers be accepted as God’s Will.10 It seems that in the beginning, the use of dialectic and argumentation was instigated purely by political, i.e. practical purpose.11

With the rapid expansion of the Muslim empire came new ideas and problems, and Muslims then had to encounter people of other faiths like the Jews, the Christians, and the Zoroastrians, who were not only learned in the sciences, but also well versed in the art of discourse and argumentation because Greek dialectics was already known to the Christian, Syriac, and Persian communities in pre-Islamic Arabian Peninsula. Hence, there was an urgent need for Muslims to understand the thinking of others and their worldview, and so the Graeco-Arabic translation movement was initiated in Baghdad shortly after its establishment in 762 CE. By then, argumentative discourses became a common phenomenon in the Muslim society, and it was not restricted only to inter-religious debates but permeated all intellectual fields like poetry, jurisprudence, grammar, theology, and philosophy. Among the earliest works translated into Arabic was Aristotle’s Topics (known as Kitāb al-Jadal), which was done at the request of Caliph al-Mahdī (d. 169/785) himself. Al-Mahdi, according to Gutas, saw in dialectic an effective method that could be used in defence of the universal legitimacy of the Abbasid rule and the universal truth of Islam over other faiths. Dialectic was used to manage all confrontations that came in the form of disputation and debate.

11. Ibid., 38.
so it was a tool to deal with political and social opposition. He ordered the theologians to be well versed in dialectic to prepare them for an encounter with the Christians, the Jews, and the heretics as he himself did in his famous debate with the first Nestorian Patriarch Timothy I (727–823 CE). By the second half of the third/ninth century, both Analytics, the Topics, and the Sophistical Refutation of Aristotle had been translated, studied, and digested. These are the logical works that form the basis of dialectic and the further development of disputation.

Al-Mahdī not only introduced dialectic as a method, he also promoted disputation as a way of settling religio-political issues. For the intellectuals, participating in debates was a way of getting social recognition and political attention, and that was how al-Ghazālī (1058–1111 CE) came to be known by Niẓām al-Mulk (1018–1092 CE). Since the scholars regularly engaged in disputation for political control and career building in the 4th/10th century, dialectic was also taught in the first Islamic college apart from jurisprudence.

Caliph al-Maʻmūn (786–833 CE) continued to use dialectic and argumentation as a means for him to assert his control over the interpretation of Islām. With the support of the Mu’tazilites, he used dialectic and argumentation to reclaim his religious authority against the traditionalists (ahl al-ḥadīth) and established his position as the ultimate interpreter of Islām. Thus, the Hanbalite’s opposition to dialectic was understandable as it systematically undermined their authority. Be it as it may, al-Mahdī and al-Maʻmūn had benefitted tremendously from Aristotle’s Topics, and in the process, the dialectic method became widely known and its significance to later development in Islamic intellectual history was huge. It was from the theological debates

regarding the unseen world ensuing from the translation of *Topics* that the demand to translate Aristotle’s *Physics* emerged.  

For more than two centuries during the classical period (i.e. 10th–12th centuries) dialectic and argumentative discourse had *diffused* into various fields of study, in particular, poetry, grammar, law, theology, and philosophy.  

Focus here, however, shall be on theology/philosophy and law. The Muslim theologians were the first to have written books on dialectic. At the end of the ninth century, Ibn al-Rīwandī (827–911 CE) wrote *ʿĀdāb al-Jadal*. Later, Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī (d. 319/931), also known as al-Kaʿbī, came up with a “correction” of Ibn al-Rīwandī’s errors in the book, but his work was in turn refuted by al-Ashʿarī (874–936 CE) and al-Māturīdī (853–944 CE). None of these works survived. However, through the available sources by al-Qirqisānī (d. after 937), al-Maqdisī, Abu al-Ḥusayn Isḥāq b. Ibraḥīm al-Kātib, Ibn Ḥazm the Ẓāhirite jurist (994–1064 CE), and Ibn Fūrak (941–1015 CE), a partial reconstruction of this earlier teaching has been made possible. Five themes that are common to all of those works, according to Miller, are:

1. the relation of *jadal* to *naẓar*;
2. question and answer;
3. counter-objective (*muʿāraḍah*);
4. the signs of defeat; and
5. the rules of conduct.  

The views of the Arabic Aristotelian philosophers on *jadal* can be gathered from their commentaries and paraphrases of

---

15. Ibid., 51–55.
16. On how during the classical period dialectic and argumentative discourse diffused into different fields of inquiry namely poetry, grammar, jurisprudence, theology, and philosophy, see Ibid., 59–117.
18. Ibid., 5-7. For details, see 8–51.
Aristotle’s *Topics*, known in Arabic as *Ṭūbīqā, Kūṭāb al-Mawāḍī*, and *Kitāb al-Ẓadāl*. Often, the name *Kitāb al-Ẓadāl* is given to a longer discussion of the subject, like what is written by al-Farābī, Ibn Sīnā, and Ibn Rushd.\(^{19}\) The philosophers and the theologians were in disagreement regarding the nature of *jadāl*. The *jadāl* of the theologians is epistemic-oriented, while that of the philosophers is opinion-oriented.\(^{20}\) This disagreement has its root in the antiquity. For the Stoics or Platonists, dialectic is the canon and criteria for discovering the truth, whereas Aristotle holds that belief (*doxa*) is inferior to demonstrative knowledge, therefore in his logic, demonstration is an art and science, while dialectic is just a method or faculty.\(^{21}\)

Later on, dialectic began to be applied in jurisprudence as well, and gradually it became integral to it. The earliest works on juristic *jadāl* are on *usūl al-fiqh*, and the first work appeared in the 11th century when Abu Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (1003–1083 CE) wrote *Ma‘ūnat al-Mubtadi‘īn wa Tadhkirat al-Muntahīn fī al-Jadāl*. He was followed by his students: al-Bājī (1013–1081 CE), who came up with *al-Minhāj fī Tarīb al-Ḥijaj*, and Ibn ‘Aqīl (1040–1119 CE) with *Kitāb al-Jadāl ʿalā Tarīqat al-Fuqahā‘*. Another early work is al-Juwaynī’s (1028–1085 CE) *al-Kāfiyah fī al-Jadāl*. This work and al-Bājī’s are the most detailed. Among the authorities cited by al-Juwaynī in *al-Kāfiyah* are al-Ustādh Abū Isḥāq (probably al-Isfarāyīnī who died in 1027 CE), Ibn Surayj, Ibn Fūrak, al-Qaṣṣ, al-Ka‘bī, and al-Jubbā‘ī.\(^{22}\) According to Miller, one can find several shared characteristics in form and style in juristic literature which are:

1. detailed arguments in defence of the author’s school (*madhhab*) and against the opposing school;

---

\(^{19}\) Ibid., 52.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., 84.

\(^{21}\) Ibid., 85–86.

\(^{22}\) Ibid., 87–89.
2. the aim is practice rather than theory, so the theoretical foundations of the argument are ignored, and the arrangement of the book follows the subject matter of fiqh literature; and

3. uniform method employed in the argumentation.\(^{23}\)

The final period of the development of juridical jadal is marked by the logical content and style, and the key work of this period is *al-Muqaddimah al-Burhāniyyah*, also known as *al-Fuṣūl li al-Nasafi*, written by the Hanafi jurist, Burhān al-Dīn al-Nasafi (d. 687/1288). This work contains more than 25 chapters, and the rules of dialectic are clearly mentioned in the introduction.\(^{24}\)

In the first half of the 17th century, an important transformation affecting the Ottoman scholarly life occurred when the works by the 15th and 16th century Persian scholars on philosophy, logic, dialectics, rational theology, semantics, rhetoric, and grammar began to be studied extensively. Such works, known as the “books of the Persians” were first taught by the Kurdish and Azeri scholars, who were known for their skilful employment of dialectical method in teaching. The development had a profound impact on the intellectual life of the later Ottoman scholars, most of whom traced their intellectual pedigree to the scholars of the period.\(^{25}\)

The end of the 16th century, by the way, was marked by the appearance of the violently puritan Kadizadeli movement, and the destruction of Istanbul observatory in 1580 was their work. It is generally believed that the movement was hostile to all rational sciences but the facts do not seem to support the conclusion. Katib Celebi, for example, reported that he himself attended the lectures of Kadizadeli where he taught among others, al-Jurjānī’s commentary of Ījī’s *al-Mawāqif*, a *summa* of

\(^{23}\) Ibid., 143–44.

\(^{24}\) Ibid., 180–81.

rational theology. In fact, many figures of this movement are said to be well versed in the rational sciences.\(^{26}\) Mehmed Birgevi, the 16th century scholar belonging to the movement, staunchly adhered to Māturīdī’s rational theology and his position regarding the study of logic, rational theology, mathematics, astronomy, and medicine was almost similar to al-Ghazālī’s position.\(^{27}\) He did not have problem with astronomy, and, therefore, the real motives behind the demolition of the Istanbul Observatory in 1580 must have been something else. It has been established that the observatory was built for the purpose of astrology, and that is the real reason for its demolition.\(^{28}\)

The impression that there was a decline of interest in rational sciences was said to be supported by statements lamenting the decline made by writers like Katib Celebi and Tashköprizāde. But without hard evidence supporting the statements, they cannot be taken at face value. Perhaps what they meant was a decline in comparison with the earlier age as other scholars of that period too made similar statements such as the Meccan scholar Ibn ʿAllān (d. 1648) and the other by an Egyptian belletrist, Aḥmad al-Khafajī (d. 1658), who were under the impression that there had been a significant increase in interest in philosophy.\(^{29}\) In fact, the Turkish scholar, Mehmed Sacaklizade (d. 1732) even believed that there was more rather than less interest in philosophy under the guise of hikmah, which he suggested might have been the cause of Ottoman military defeat as a divine punishment.\(^{30}\) As a matter of fact, al-Abhari’s Hidāyat al-Hikmah was widely studied by the Ottoman students in the 17th and 18th century, and this is supported by the fact that there are not less than fifteen extant glosses on the work belonging to the period.\(^{31}\) Hence, there is no conclusive evidence in support of a decline thesis, instead, as El-Rouayheb’s study

\(^{26}\) Ibid., 14–15.  
\(^{27}\) Ibid., 16–17.  
\(^{28}\) Ibid., 18.  
\(^{29}\) Ibid., 19.  
\(^{30}\) Ibid., 21.  
\(^{31}\) Ibid., 22–23.
has shown, the study of philosophy and rational sciences in the 17th century Ottoman was actually invigorated by the infusion of books and scholars of Persian, Azeri, and Kurdish origin.\textsuperscript{32}

The first decades of the 17th century was a time of unrest in the Kurdish borderlands between the Ottoman Empire and Safavid Iran. That was the time a Kurdish scholar by the name of Mullā Mahmūd came and settled in the city of Damascus. According to local biographer, Muḥammad Amīn al-Muḥībbī (1650–1699), Mullā Maḥmūd taught the books of the Persians in Damascus, and it is believed that with him, the gate of verification (bāb al-taḥqīq) in Damascus was opened.\textsuperscript{33} The term, taḥqīq, was used in Islamic theology to denote a rational demonstration of the truth of the Islamic creed as opposed to taqlīd, uncritical acceptance of the creed. Similarly, in Ibn Sīna’s writings, taḥqīq means independent logical demonstration of the truth of a philosophical view, while taqlīd means uncritical acceptance of such a view. Hence, a verifier (muḥaqqiq) would critically assess a view and not be satisfied in just clarifying the accepted views.\textsuperscript{34} The books of the Persians are mostly in the instrumental and rational sciences like logic, semantics-rhetorics (al-maʿānī wa al-bayān), and grammar. However, taḥqīq could also refer to the works authored by the great Timurid scholars like al-Abharī (1200–1265 CE), al-Qazwīnī (1203–1283 CE) and al-Taftāzānī (1322–1390 CE), who were Persians or of Central Asian origin. The said books were introduced to the students and scholars of Damascus by Mullā Mahmūd, and among his renowned students were Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulsī (1641–1731), Abū al-Mawāhib al-Ḥanbalī (1635–1714), Uthmān al-Qaṭṭān (d. 1704), and ʿAbd al-Qādir ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī (d. 1688).\textsuperscript{35}

Two other Persian scholars that have to be mentioned in this regard are Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 1502) and ʿIṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 1535), the former, according to El-Rouayheb, is

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 26.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 27–28.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 28.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 29.
arguably the most important Islamic philosopher in the period between the 13th and the 17th centuries as his works on logic and theology were widely studied, and he had a profound influence on later Ottoman and Mughal scholarship, whereas the latter was known not only for his contribution in semantics-rhetoric and grammar, but also in logic. According to Katib Celebi in his Kashf al-Ẓunūn, the works of both scholars were widely studied in the mid-17th century Ottoman Empire.36

The books of the Persians are important because they are infused with the idea of taḥqīq, that is, one has to verify the truth of a proposition, rather than just accept a view uncritically, and be satisfied only in reiterating and explicating it. As such, even the commentaries and glosses should be written with the aim of critically verifying the propositions in order to move beyond imitation (taqlīd). Such an approach is evident in the works of Dawānī and Isfarāyīnī. Mulla Maḥmūd not only introduced the books, but he also imparted to the Damascene students a new manner of instruction based on an extensive use of dialectics, by which the Kurdish and Persian scholars were known.37 The science of munāẓarah or Ādāb al-baḥth is among the contributions of the Central Asian scholars as it first emerged in the writings of Rukn al-Dīn al-ʿAmīdī (d. 1218) and Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandi (d. 1303).

Risālah Waladīyyah by Sācaḳlīzāde

One of the students of ‘Abd al-Ghānī al-Nābulsi was Muḥammad bin Abī Bakr al-Marʿashī (d. 1737 or 1742), a Hanafi jurist and a sūfī, who was also known as Sācaḳlīzāde. He was the author of several works, which included works in rational sciences like munāẓarah, logic, and rational theology. Like al-Ghazālī, in the beginning he studied philosophy and even wrote a book entitled Nashr al-Ṭawāliʿ, but then he changed his way and became a

36. Ibid., 31–32.
37. Ibid., 34–35.
Sāçāḳlīzāde was born and received his early education in Marʿāsh, a town situated in southwestern Anatolia, which was famous as a centre of learning, with a number of schools (madāris) and colleges (jawāmiʿ). He lived during the reign of Sūltān Mustafā Khān II (1074–1149 AH) and Sūltān Maḥmūd Khān I (1108–1168 AH), who were known for their love for knowledge. After finishing his early education in his hometown, he went to Istanbul to continue his studies under the renowned scholars there, and then travelled to Damascus to continue his studies in Ḥadīth, Tafsīr, and Taṣawwuf. Among his teachers were al-Nābulsi, from whom he studied Taṣawwuf in Damascus, and Ḥamzah Afandī al-Dārandī, who taught him Fīqh Akbar of Abū Ḥanīfah. He then returned to Marʿāsh, where he spent the rest of his life teaching and writing until his death in 1145 or 1150. Listed below are the titles of some of his works:

1. Tahrīr al-Taqrīr in disputation
2. Tartīb al-Ulūm
3. Taqrīr al-Qawānīn fī Ādāb al-Baḥth
4. Tawḍīḥ Zubdat al-Manāẓir
5. Ímam Ḥanīfah
6. Hāshiyah ʿalā al-Khayālī
7. Hāshiyah ʿala Sharḥ al-Taftāzānī ʿala al-ʿAqāʿid al-Ḥanafī
8. Hāshiyah ʿalā Sharḥ Risālat al-Ādāb li Ṭashkubrizādeh
9. Al-Risālah al-Waladiyyah
10. Zubdat al-Manāẓir
11. Salsabīl al-Maʿānī

---

39. Ibid., 12.
40. Ibid., 14.
41. Ibid., 17–18.
42. Taqrīr al-Qawānīn fī Ādāb al-Baḥth, MS 1705, Beineke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University Library.
43. Hāshiyah Sāçāḳlīzādeh ʿalā Tāshkubrizādeh min al-Ādāb, MS 1886, Beineke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University Library.
Sāçaḳlīzāde is said to be hostile to the study of philosophy, but he is not totally against the study of rational sciences like logic, dialectics, mathematics, and astronomy, which he classified as farḍ kifāyah. In fact, he also stressed the importance of rational theology and the need to study the major texts in the field such as al-Mawāqif by al-Ījī, and al-Maqāṣid by al-Taftāzānī. Among the sciences that he categorised as farḍ kifāyah is Ādāb al-baḥth, the art of disputation which is also known as Fann or Ilm al-Munāẓarah, Sināʿat Adāb al-Baḥth, Sināʿat al-Tawjīh, and Ilm Adāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓarah. This art is recommended for budding students, not for them to win an argument but as a useful instrument for reading and understanding scholarly works in various disciplines. In Tartīb al-ʿUlūm, he wrote: “…someone who has no share in this science will hardly be able to understand scholarly enquiries.” As an example, he cited the commentary by Jāmī on Ibn Ḥājib’s handbook on syntax, al-Kāfiyah, which was widely studied in Ottoman madrasahs, and he said, could only be understood by students who had some understanding of logic and munāẓarah. He gave special emphasis on the importance of having a working knowledge of rational and instrumental sciences. After Arabic, the Qurān, and the basics of faith, the following subjects are to be studied according to the following order: morphology, syntax, basic positive law (ahkām), logic, dialectics, rational theology, semantics-rhetoric, and jurisprudence.

46. Ibid., 74.
47. Sāçaḳlīzāde, Tartīb al-ʿUlūm, 141.
49. Ibid., 116.
He wrote two treatises in the art of disputation (fann al-munāẓarah): a bigger work entitled Taqrīr al-Qawānīn al-Mutadāwilah min ʿIlm al-Munāẓarah, and a summary of it entitled al-Risālah al-Waladiyyah fī Fann al-Munāẓarah. The Waladiyyah was written because the author was not satisfied with the available texts used by the students of his time. It had been repeatedly printed in Cairo in the early 20th century and adopted as the standard handbook in Egyptian madrasahs. It has a number of commentaries, which include a self-commentary by the author himself. Other known commentaries are written by the following authors:

1. Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī al-Āmidī (ca. 1150/1737)
2. ʿUmar ibn Husayn Qaraḥiṣārī (1200/1785–6)
3. Ḥasan ibn Muḥammad al-ʿAṭṭār (1250/1834)
4. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ibn Ḥusayn Walī al-Dīn al-Āmidī
5. Ḥusayn ibn Ḥaydar at-Tibrīzī al-Marʿashī
6. Mullā ʿUmarzāde Muḥammad ibn Ḥusayn al-Bihishtī al-Ḥijābī
7. Ḥasan ibn Muṣṭafā al-Islāmbulī Nāzikzāde.

The most important commentary of the Waladiyyah was written by ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Āmidī. For this commentary, Āmidī...
referred to several other works notably the following three:

1. *Ḥāshiah* by Sāçaklīzāde himself;
2. *Ḥāshiah Qurrah Khalīl al-Rūmī*;\(^{55}\) and

The Structure of the *Waladiyyah*

The aim of a *munāẓarah* is to know “the truth” by means of a regulated disputation, in which a proposition and its proof can be cross-examined by the disputants. A self-evident proposition, therefore, is out of question. Only a proposition that is not self-evident can be disputed, and it includes the premise of the proof of the proposition, the definition, and the categorisation. The *Waladiyyah*, therefore, is divided into three chapters: definition (*taʿrīf*); categorisation (*taqsīm*); and assent (*taṣdīq*); and the last chapter being the longest and divided into three discourses, namely denial (*manʿ*), objection (*muʿāraḍah*), and refutation (*naqḍ*).

In a *munāẓarah*, the rules of logic must be observed. A definition can be disputed by the questioner if it is non-inclusive, or non-exclusive; or if it entails absurdity (*muḥāl*). A proposition can be disputed if (i) it lacks proof; (ii) it contradicts other valid propositions; or (iii) the proof given does not grant the conclusion or leads to an opposite conclusion instead. In situation (i), the questioner can either reject the proposition altogether because the burden of proof is on the claimant, or he can demand proof (*ṭalab al-dalīl*) from him. Even if the proof is provided by the claimant, like in situation (ii), the questioner can still dispute the proposition, by invalidating (*ibṭāl*) it, i.e. by contradicting the

---

\(^{55}\) There could have been a mix up here, because our search has led us instead to a manuscript entitled *Ḥāshiah Qurrah Khalīl ʿalā Sharḥ Masʿud al-Rūmī ʿalā Adāb al-Buṭṭh li al-Samārqandī*. However, it is possible that the same author might have written another gloss on the *Waladiyyah*. Earlier edition was published by Dar Saʿādat in 1318H, and another was printed together with another commentary by Muhammad bin Hussayn al-Buḥtī, a.k.a. Mullā Umarzāde (Cairo: Mustafa Ḥalabī, 1380/1961).
the questioner has to ensure that the proposition is not a self-evident truth, and that it has not been substantiated with proof. He cannot deny the admissibility of a self-evident proposition or demand proof for it. But if it is not self-evident, then he can demand proof for it.

2. when the proof is given by the respondent, the questioner can either oppose the proposition with another proposition, or refute the premise of the proof for not granting the conclusion, or for leading to an absurd conclusion.

3. the respondent and questioner will take turns in defending their proposition and proof until either: (i) the questioner prevails because the respondent is unable to reply to his objection, meaning the questioner successfully throws out a proposition; or (ii) the respondent prevails because the questioner cannot reply to his counter-argument, meaning that the proposition is successfully defended.
The Importance of Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓarah

Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓarah has been developed as a tool of knowledge, and it rests on the premise that knowledge is possible and truth is verifiable. Three causes by which knowledge is created by God in the soul are the sound senses (ḥawās salīmah), the intellect (ʿaql), and the true report (khabar ṣādiq). Nazar is the act of the intellect, which is the indirect perceiver of the realities of things. It acquires knowledge of the causes through the effects, and the nature of the thing, which is hidden from the senses and imagination, becomes manifest to the intellect by way of inferring it from its effects and actions, such as when the Existence of God and His Attributes are being inferred from His actions and creation.

For Muslim theologians, nazār is generally held as synonymous with jadal and it is a valid method for attaining truth, and to seek it, therefore, is obligatory for all Muslims. Nazar is a type of thinking (fikr), which is defined as an intentional movement of thought from meaning to meaning. When the aim is to obtain knowledge or a strong conviction (ẓann), it is called nazār (investigating). Nazar is synonymous with baḥth (searching).

58. There is no disagreement among Muslims regarding the obligation to seek knowledge, but there is disagreement whether or not faith without evidence—i.e. faith based on the opinions of others or taqlīd—is valid. The disagreement, however, pertains only to the person who is firm (jāzīm) in his faith, while for those who have doubts, there is no disagreement that such a faith is not valid. Such a person, nevertheless, is still considered and treated as a Muslim based on his outward profession of the faith. See Ibrāhīm bin Muḥammad al-Bayjurī, Tuḥfat al-Murīd Sharḥ Jawharat al-Tawḥīd (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2007), 42–48.
which is defined as affirming either a positive or a negative relation between two things by the way of an inference (istidlāl).\(^6^0\) In \textit{fikr}, \textit{nazār} and \textit{baḥth}, the intellect moves from what is known (\textit{maʿlūm}) to what is unknown (\textit{majhūl}), and what is sought (\textit{maṭlūb}) is knowledge. From a concept, what is sought, if possible, is a definition (\textit{ḥadd}), and if not, a description (\textit{rasm}), while from an assent, what is sought is an argument (\textit{ḥujjah}), be it a deduction (\textit{qiyās}) or an induction (\textit{istiqrāʾ}), or others.\(^6^1\) Errors and mistakes are common in thinking and reasoning; therefore, it is crucial that the procedure of valid reasoning be established and followed.\(^6^2\)

In the presence of differences and conflicting opinions, \textit{munāẓarah} serves as a method of verification (\textit{taḥqīq}), whereas the sophists use disagreements (\textit{khilāf} and \textit{ikhtilāf}) and contradicting opinions among the intellectuals as one of their arguments in support of their denial of objective knowledge.\(^6^3\) But a disagreement may be caused by an error in reasoning and it does not deny the fact that through a correct inference, the intellect may be led to knowledge. It is also possible to have a disagreement on necessary knowledge due to a lack of understanding or because of pure obstinacy.\(^6^4\) Hence, as far as

\(^{60}\) Jurjānī, \textit{Al-Tāʿrīfāt}, s.v. “\textit{al-baḥth}”.

\(^{61}\) Abū Ḥamīd al-Ghazālī, \textit{Miʿyār al-ʿIlm} (Cairo, Dar al-Maʿarif, 1960), 36.

\(^{62}\) Nonetheless, according to the Ashʿarītes, there is no necessary relation between knowledge and a valid reasoning. It is possible that a person will not attain knowledge despite a long and laborious efforts, while the other person knows instantly even without going through a process of reasoning. As a matter of fact, not all knowledge is acquired through reasoning because in fact some is given (\textit{wahbī}), like what is known as mental speech (\textit{ḥadīth al-nafs}) and intuition (\textit{ḥads}). This is the type of knowledge that serves as the foundation of all inferential knowledge, so, even inferential knowledge itself is ultimately intuitional.

\(^{63}\) Saʿād al-Dīn Taftāzanī, \textit{Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid}, 23. The sophists are known for their denial of necessary knowledge (\textit{darāriyyāt}), knowledge of the sense (\textit{ḥissiyāt}), a priori knowledge (\textit{badīhiyyāt}), and inferential knowledge (\textit{nazariyyāt}). With regard to the obstinate, obviously their denial of reality does not hold water because the denial itself is a judgement, and no judgement is possible without affirming something as the reality.

\(^{64}\) Ibid., 42–43. The real challenge of scepticism is actually not against the possibility of knowledge, but rather the justification of every proposition because the denial of all knowledge is self-contradicting, and it is not possible for a person to suspend all judgements and live in permanent
Islam is concerned, disagreements do not mean that objective knowledge is not possible; it only means efforts have to be made to verify the truth, and with proper method and right intention, it can be achieved. In Arabic, there are actually two words that can be used to denote disagreement: (i) *khilāf*, if the intention of the dispute (*munāẓahah*) is to verify truth from falsehood (*li taḥqīq al-ḥaqq wa ibṭāl al-bāṭil*), and (ii) *shiqāq*, if there is no such intention, and then it would only lead to enmity and disunity. Disagreement in the sense of *shiqāq* is totally blameworthy and among its causes are evil desire (*hawā*), blind imitation (*taqlīd*), fanaticism (*taʿaṣṣub*), and love of prestige (*ḥubb al-jāh*). Such an attitude is clearly antithetical to the spirit of Islam which enjoins that any disagreement be resolved through a process of verification (*taḥqīq*), whereby the truth of the matter is ascertained, and this is actually the spirit behind *munāẓarah* as a science.

The word, *munāẓarah*, which is derived from either *nazīr* (meaning opposite or opponent), or from *nazār*, which signifies *ibsār* (to make visible), *inīzār* (waiting), *fikr* (thinking), and *muqābalah* (exchange), gives the impression of two opposing sides, each one is trying to make visible to the other the truth of his view and the error of his opponent’s in an exchange of doubt. It only makes sense for the rational person to suspend his judgement temporarily, i.e., until he is satisfied with the proof. So, the real problem should be of verification, rather than the possibility of knowledge, but it has been exaggerated by the sophists so as to make it appear that objective knowledge is not possible.

65. Al-Jurjānī, *Taʿrīfāt*, s.v. “*khilāf*”. *Khilāf* and *ikhilāf* are usually used as synonyms, but Tahānawī pointed out three slight differences, namely: (i) *ikhilāf* refers to an opinion founded upon proof, while *khilāf* is an opinion that is not founded upon proof; (ii) *khilāf* refers to the weaker between two opinions (i.e. *qawl marjūḥ*); and (iii) *ikhilāf* refers to a disagreement between two contemporaries, while *khilāf* refers to a disagreement between two persons with the dissenting person (*mukhālif*) coming later, making it effectively weaker compared to earlier established opinion. See Kashshāf, s.v. “*ikhilāf*”.


67. Ibid., 139–43.

arguments and counter-arguments. Technically, *munāzarah* means mutual refutation (*mudāfaʿah*), or an exchange of words *(taraddud al-kalām)* between two persons, each one is trying to defend his own view while refuting the opposing view in order to make truth manifest regardless of whether the truth comes from him or from his opponent or whether what is being manifested is the truth alone or the truth together with the error of the opposing view.\(^{69}\) It is, according to al-Tahānawī, the science of proper procedures *(ādāb)* or the ways *(ṭuruq)* by which is known how a conclusion *(maṭlūb)* is affirmed or denied, or the inadmissability of the proof, with the opponent. The subject matter of this science is “scientific inquiry” *(baḥth)*, and it is also defined as a debate between two sides regarding the relation between two things, in order to make clear the truth.\(^{70}\) The use of the term *ādāb* (sing. *Adāb*) here is very significant and Miller’s translation of the term as *rules of politeness* does not do justice to it because in Islām, *Adāb* does not just mean politeness, but more profoundly, it is connected to knowledge and ethics. *Adāb*, according to al-Attas, means right action,\(^{71}\) and in the present context, refers to a proper manner of conducting a scientific inquiry *(baḥth)* and of engaging in an academic disputation *(munāẓarah)*. By “proper,” what is meant are two things: (i) the right aim, namely to obtain knowledge, truth, and certainty, and (ii) the right method of conducting an inquiry or a disputation.

*ʿIlm al-Munāẓarah* is closely related to logic, and it refers to the rules *(qawānīn)* of a rational discourse by which a preferred opinion *(muwajjah)* is known, so much so that one who does not know it might not be able to understand and benefit from a rational discourse.\(^{72}\) This science, according to Sāçaḳlīzāde, closely resembles what the *uṣūliyyūn* mention in syllogism, yet

\(^{69}\) Ibid., 57.


\(^{71}\) For the definition of *Adāb* and explanation why *taḍīb* is the most proper term denoting education in Islām, see Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, *Islam and Secularism* (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1993), 149–52.

\(^{72}\) Sāçaḳlīzāde, *Tarīb alʿUlūm*, 141. Perhaps, he is referring to the disagreement on the technical term, one of which is whether *munāzarah* should be called a science (*ʿilm*), an art (*fann*), or a craft (*sināʿah*).
they are not exactly the same because *munāẓarah* conforms to logical proof (*dalīl manṭiqī*), but what is mentioned by the *uṣūliyyūn* conforms with juridical syllogism (*qiyyās fiqhī*). There are also some disagreements regarding the technical terms, and the term “science” (*ʿilm*) is not used by some to refer to this “art” (*fann*), and so it is called instead “*fann al-munāẓarahi*” and “*ādāb al-baḥth*.” At times, the term “*munāẓārah*” is used simply to refer to the quality of the debaters, so it means an exchange of view between two persons.73 

In *Ṭartīb al-ʿUlūm*, a work on the classification of knowledge by Sāçaḳlīzāde, *ʿIlm al-Munāẓarah* is classified under the category of rational sciences (*ʿulūm ʿaqliyyah*), which are considered useful, together with logic (*ʿilm al-mīzān*), the principles of the science of theology, and mathematics (*riyāḍiyyāt*).74 In *Risālah Waladiyyah*, it is mentioned that there is no doubt about the excellence of this science, and the disagreement is only on whether or not it is a communal obligation (*farḍ kifāyah*).75 The ruling (*ḥukm*) regarding the taking up of a particular science depends on the nature of the subject matter in question, and the basic rule is that only knowledge that is good and beneficial for the individual and the society must be sought, and what is evil and harmful must be avoided.76 Therefore, certain limits must be observed with regard to the pursuit of certain sciences like *ʿilm al-kalām*, to ensure that only what is beneficial to the safeguarding of the faith is sought, while the hair-splitting argument (*naẓar*) and disputation (*munāẓarah*) must be avoided because they are harmful.77 Hence, it is forbidden for students to dwell on the unnecessary details of proofs, and to venture into debates (*mujādalah*) among deviant sects and philosophers.78 What is specifically prohibited is natural philosophy and theology, while logic, which is also a branch of philosophy, should not be included, except the part which is

73. Ibid., 141.
74. Ibid., 84–85.
75. Al-Amidi, *Sharḥ Āmidī*, 27.
77. Ibid., 109.
78. Ibid., 111.
mixed up with the belief system of the philosophers. Thus, as long as what is being taught to students is purely logic, it should not be prohibited. Instead, logic should be deemed commendable (mandūb) or fard kifāyah because of its benefit in sharpening the minds of students.79 Furthermore, being part of kalām and uṣūl al-fiqh, the importance of logic cannot be denied, but students are reminded to be intelligent enough so as not to waste their time in studying the unnecessary detailed texts.80

Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓarah has been developed in order to regulate debates and every competent scholar in the past had to be skillful in the art in order to effectively deal with the khilāf.81 When a faqīh (jurisconsult) is described in a biographical notice as someone learned in madhhab, khilāf, and jadal, what is meant is that he is learned in the doctrines that have been agreed upon as well as in the doctrines where there have been disagreements, and that he is also well versed in the art of disputation which would enable him to defend his thesis. In this instance, the term madhhab, which is usually translated as school of law, is used to mean a certain orientation, view, doctrine, or an accepted thesis, while khilāf is the conflicting opinion or the opposite of madhhab; but it could also be used to mean the opposite of ijmāʿ. Gradually, through association, these terms became identified with one another, and hence the confusion in usage.82

The difference between munāẓarah and jadal is in the aim. The aim of munāẓarah, according to Sāçaḳlīzāde, is to know the truth, while the aim of jadal is just to defend a position and destroy the opponent. A dialectician is bent on undermining his opponent’s proposal and proof at all costs, but Sāçaḳlīzāde was against the use of tricks (ḥiyal) and fallacies (mughālaṭāt) in arguments, except when the opponent was an obstinate (mutaʿannid).83 Even though, in principle, jadal might be employed

79. Ibid., 114–115. See also 139.
80. Ibid., 140–41.
83. Sāçaḳlīzāde, Tarīb alʿUlūm, 142.
in any debate, it is the jurists (fuqahā’) who are widely known for using it extensively, to the extent that it is generally thought that jadal is their specialty. Hence, reprimands have been made against disputation on trivial legal issues, which the fuqahā’ call khilāfīyyāt, and which has given rise to the science of jurisprudential dialectic known as ‘ilm al-khilāf. Nevertheless, Sāçaḳlīzāde noted the fact that some Hanafī jurists did employ dialectical fallacies (mughālaṭāt) in their defence of Abū Hanīfah’s opinions and in their rebuttal of his opponent’s view.84

Al-Ghazālī accepted the use of the method of argumentation in theology and jurisprudence provided that the aim is purely in defence of truth.85 A debate, therefore, is prohibited if the intention is just to defeat or subjugate an opponent, and making evident personal greatness in the eyes of man, or if the real intention is winning admiration, bickering, and getting attention because it will become the root cause of destructive acts such as envy, arrogance, backbiting, hypocrisy, and others.86 What is condemned by al-Ghazālī in Ayyuhā al-Walad is jadal in the sense of mukābarah (obstinacy), where the aim is not to know the truth or to win the debate but just to display arrogance.87

The real purpose of a debate is to bring together the opposing opinions and the arguments so that the true opinion can be determined objectively. Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓarah has been introduced to ensure that any debate, regardless of the subject matter, be conducted according to the scientific and moral standard. This method, known as jadal or munāẓarah, has been developed and practised by Muslim theologians and jurists as a method of knowledge and a proper way of resolving disputes.

84. Ibid., 142–43.
86. Ibid., 169–77.
87. Abū Zahrah, Tārīkh al-Jadal, 6. See also al-Ghazālī’s condemnation of munāẓarah in this sense in his Kitāb al-ʿIlm.
References


_____Sharḥ ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Āmidī ʿala al-Risālah al-Waladiyyah. N.p.: Dar Saʿādat, 1318 AH.


Hāshiyah Sācaḳlīzādah ʿalā Tāshkūbri min al-Ādāb, MS 1886, Beineke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University Library.

Taqrīr al-Qawānīn fi Ādāb al-Bahth, MS 1705, Beineke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University Library.